The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have jointly released an updated security advisory warning that Medusa ransomware threat actors are actively infiltrating enterprise environments, disabling security tools, exfiltrating sensitive files, and encrypting entire networks.

The updated alert (AA25-071A) reflects comprehensive forensic findings through April 2026, confirming that Medusa has compromised more than 500 organizations across critical infrastructure sectors including healthcare, education, legal, insurance, manufacturing, and technology.

CISA Warns Medusa Ransomware Steals Data

First observed in June 2021 as a closed malware operation, Medusa shifted toward an industrialized Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model around 2023. Under this structure, core developers lease ransomware payloads to recruited affiliates in exchange for a percentage of extortion revenues.

The syndicate operates a multi-stage double-extortion scheme, exfiltrating intellectual property and patient records, then encrypting target systems and publishing the stolen data on a dedicated dark web leak portal.

HHS joined as a co-author of the updated bulletin due to the group’s relentless targeting of hospitals and public health organizations, which continue to suffer disproportionate operational impact from Medusa ransomware campaigns.

Affiliates gain initial access by collaborating with underground Initial Access Brokers (IABs), which offer payouts ranging from $100 to $1 million for valid corporate access credentials.

Threat actors also target known software vulnerabilities, including the ScreenConnect authentication bypass (CVE-2024-1709), Fortinet FortiClient EMS SQL injection (CVE-2023-48788), Fortra GoAnywhere MFT deserialization flaws, and a newly identified BeyondTrust remote code execution vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-1731.

As detailed in the joint security bulletin released by CISA and Federal Partners, Medusa operators routinely weaponize public vulnerabilities within twenty-four hours of disclosure, and occasionally prior to public patch availability, making accelerated patching windows essential for defending critical endpoints.

Once inside a network perimeter, operators rely heavily on living-off-the-land techniques using native Windows binaries such as PowerShell cmd.exe, and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to map internal infrastructure without triggering anomalous process alerts.

Adversaries deploy vulnerable or stolen kernel drivers to terminate endpoint detection and response (EDR) software, dump cached credentials from LSASS memory, and abuse legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) platforms like AnyDesk, Atera, and SimpleHelp.

These stealth techniques mirror broader industry trends in disabling endpoint detection before launching encryption routines.

Threat actors also deploy tools like Mimikatz, CrackMapExec, and Rclone to harvest network secrets and stage bulk file exfiltration, relying on weaponizing administrative utilities to mask malicious commands behind routine system maintenance.

Threat Characteristic	Operational Specification
Operation Model	Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) / Double Extortion
Victim Scale	500+ Confirmed Critical Infrastructure Organizations
Initial Access Vectors	Broker credentials, ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1709), Fortinet (CVE-2023-48788), BeyondTrust (CVE-2026-1731)
Payload Binary	`gaze.exe` (Terminates database/backup services, AES-256 encryption)
Communication Channels	Dedicated Tor live chat portals and encrypted Tox messaging
Financial Demands	Ransoms up to $15 million (average payouts near $260,000)

The Windows encryption payload, compiled as gaze.exe, systematically stops security services, deletes volume shadow copies, and terminates database management systems before encrypting files with the .medusa extension using AES-256 algorithms.

Victims are typically allotted 48 hours to initiate negotiations via Tor-based live chats or Tox messenger channels. The syndicate frequently offers temporary discounts for prompt payments while threatening to auction stolen corporate datasets if deadlines are missed.

Federal agencies urge critical infrastructure operators to prioritize patching vulnerabilities immediately, segment internal subnets to restrict lateral movement, and strictly limit inbound remote management services.

Security teams should enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication, maintain immutable, offline backups, and audit endpoint telemetry for unauthorized RMM installations and anomalous execution of administrative tools.

IoC’s

IOC	Type	Description
143.244.47[.]89	IP Address	IP used to access PHP Web Shell (Mullvad VPN)
167.88.166[.]173	IP Address	Ligolo proxy IP
https://3324.requestcatcher[.]com/hihi	URL	Additional URL associated with Ligolo commands
143.110.243[.]154 aka erp.ranasons[.]com	IP Address & URL	Exfiltration IP/domain
185.238.231[.]16	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (ExpressVPN)
23.234.89[.]195	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (Mullvad VPN)
146.70.172[.]247	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (Mullvad VPN)
155.2.215[.]71	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session
23.234.106[.]242	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (Mullvad VPN)
23.234.93[.]112	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (Mullvad VPN)
37.19.21[.]180	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (Mullvad VPN)
155.2.215[.]69	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session
185.238.231[.]98	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (ExpressVPN)
37.221.66[.]239	IP Address	Bash TCP reverse shell destination
185.135.86[.]185	IP Address	IP associated with SimpleHelp session
83.138.53[.]139	IP Address	IP associated with Nezha backdoor
185.238.231[.]4	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (ExpressVPN)
185.238.231[.]77	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (ExpressVPN)
185.238.231[.]85	IP Address	IP used to access BeyondTrust session (ExpressVPN)
85.155.186[.]121	IP Address	IP associated with SimpleHelp session
http://45.61.150[.]94:8000/storm[.]exe	URL	SimpleHelp agent was downloaded to the victim using this URL
94.156.67[.]145	IP Address	IP associated with backdoor

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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